Evidence continues to accumulate that the recent IAEA report is not a document of political substance nor scientific merit. The Real News interviews a former IAEA weapons program inspector, Robert Kelly. Kelly is currently a senior research fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Edit: Part 2 of the above interview.
Tuesday, November 15, 2011
Wednesday, November 9, 2011
[Short entry] Joe Cirncione on the IAEA report on Al-Jazeera
Corroborating viewpoint (video) to that espoused here by Joe Cirncione of the Ploughshares Fund:
The hype about the latest IAEA report about Iran’s nuclear program was much more frightening than the actual content. Yesterday, Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshares Fund, an organization devoted to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, informed a seemingly stunned Tony Birtley that most of what’s been revealed “is not new”.
[Short entry] IAEA report on Iran released; much more ado about not much
Politico's 'Morning Defense' daily email column reports today that:
Politico's "take":
The 2007 NIE certainly did call into question Iran's bomb program. But according to David Albright, speaking at The George Washington University October 7, 2011, Iran has likely enriched enough low-enriched uranium to allow them to make enough high-enriched uranium for at least one nuclear weapon upon further enrichment within the timescale of a couple to a few years.
But writing last year in Foreign Affairs, Lindsay and Takeyh, assure us that, 'Washington can contain and mitigate the consequences of Tehran's nuclear defiance, keeping an abhorrent outcome from becoming a catastrophic one.'
I think this is the right perspective. Nuclear weapons proliferation is abhorrent in any context, as is their very existence. The central issue being that in a post-nuclear-Iran world, they have an even less useful weapon than the U.S. or its allies possess: for Iran's use of such a weapon would be attributable and the response would be swift and apocalyptic for Iran's leadership and, unfortunately, its people.
IN ITS LONG-AWAITED REPORT, the International Atomic Energy Agency says it "has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device." The report released Tuesday is here: http://politi.co/tgsvX9
Politico's "take":
The IAEA's report is likely to put to rest doubts about Iran's intentions that have fueled debate in the United States since 2007, when a National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Tehran had abandoned efforts to build a nuclear bomb. Look for a new urgency to deal with the issue as world leaders take seriously the signals from Israel about a possible attack.
The 2007 NIE certainly did call into question Iran's bomb program. But according to David Albright, speaking at The George Washington University October 7, 2011, Iran has likely enriched enough low-enriched uranium to allow them to make enough high-enriched uranium for at least one nuclear weapon upon further enrichment within the timescale of a couple to a few years.
But writing last year in Foreign Affairs, Lindsay and Takeyh, assure us that, 'Washington can contain and mitigate the consequences of Tehran's nuclear defiance, keeping an abhorrent outcome from becoming a catastrophic one.'
I think this is the right perspective. Nuclear weapons proliferation is abhorrent in any context, as is their very existence. The central issue being that in a post-nuclear-Iran world, they have an even less useful weapon than the U.S. or its allies possess: for Iran's use of such a weapon would be attributable and the response would be swift and apocalyptic for Iran's leadership and, unfortunately, its people.
Thursday, September 29, 2011
[Short entry] Switzerland to abolish nuclear power (maybe)
Switzerland Senate Endorses Nuclear Phase Out
I'm a little behind the headlines with this posting (as research and preparations for the move to New Mexico have been keeping me pretty busy) but this important news item shouldn't be overlooked.
The Federal Assembly of Switzerland or Parliament, with the September 28 vote by the Senate, has passed the law banning the development of new plants (with a stipulation to 'keep Parliament informed'), to phase-out nuclear power by 2034, and to develop renewable sources.
Of course, there's the question of replacement sources for the 40% of Switzerland's current total power use that comes from nuclear power plants and what this says about the feasibility and eventuality of putting this decision into practice.
If I were a betting man, I'd bet that there will be further legislative decisions affecting the outcome of the planned 2034 phase-out.
I'm a little behind the headlines with this posting (as research and preparations for the move to New Mexico have been keeping me pretty busy) but this important news item shouldn't be overlooked.
The Federal Assembly of Switzerland or Parliament, with the September 28 vote by the Senate, has passed the law banning the development of new plants (with a stipulation to 'keep Parliament informed'), to phase-out nuclear power by 2034, and to develop renewable sources.
Of course, there's the question of replacement sources for the 40% of Switzerland's current total power use that comes from nuclear power plants and what this says about the feasibility and eventuality of putting this decision into practice.
If I were a betting man, I'd bet that there will be further legislative decisions affecting the outcome of the planned 2034 phase-out.
Wednesday, August 3, 2011
[Short entry] Five sieverts detected at Fukushima Dai'ichi reactor one
The Sydney Morning Herald is carrying the story, "Japan to pay billions to victims of Fukushima".
Any questions of a "partial" vs. a "full" meltdown are resolved by the measurement of 5 sievert equivalent dose in the immediate proximity of reactor one. The Fukushima nuclear power plant suffered a complete meltdown consisting of the breech of both internal and external containment.
Any questions of a "partial" vs. a "full" meltdown are resolved by the measurement of 5 sievert equivalent dose in the immediate proximity of reactor one. The Fukushima nuclear power plant suffered a complete meltdown consisting of the breech of both internal and external containment.
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
[Short entry] Iran confirms suspected missile silos
William Broad at The New York Times reports that the Iranian government has "unveiled" "deep underground" missile silos. They're capable of launching "long-range" missiles. And an Iranian general, Asghar Qelichkani, claims that the missile are "ready to hit their predetermined targets." The NYT article isn't too specific about what the General means by this. But the official press agency of the People's Republic of China, the Xinhua news service is happy to tell us:
There's a lot of smoke here but not too much fire. The existence of the silos has long been suspected, as the NYT mentions. While the existence of the silos opens the possibility that they may be used to house nuclear-tipped missiles, there is still no further, concrete evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. The silos are an effective defense even if they "only" house "conventional" weapons.
Strategically speaking, even in the unlikely event that Iran announced a nuclear arsenal tomorrow, with the "long-range" delivery implied by the silos, their use of a nuclear device is necessarily, strictly, as they have declared in the silos' announcement, defensive. 'Attribution,' the forensic science of nuclear weapons would conclusively identify the source of the plutonium and/or uranium used to make the weapon. Not to mention the fact that when a missile is launched anywhere in the world, US and EU satellites know about it immediately. And the full trajectory is determined within seconds, from launch point to target. The US (and ROTW*, for that matter) response would be immediate and devastating.
The important question that needs to be asked of the US government is why it continues a policy policy of promoting proliferation. We only need look to N. Korea to see its consequences.
*ROTW=Rest of the World
Aerospace commander of Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Amir Ali Hajizadeh, said Tuesday that Iran's missiles have the range of 2,000 km and can reach U.S. bases in the region and also Israel.
Iran does not need to increase the range of its missiles since Israel is just 1,200 km away from Iran and the U.S. bases are even nearer, some 120 to 700 km away from Iran, said the commander.
With the existing missiles, Iran can hit the targets from the Iranian central cities of Semnan and Damghan, Hajizadeh said.
He dismissed the threats by the Europeans and said that Iran has designed and developed its missiles for U.S. and Israel targets.
There's a lot of smoke here but not too much fire. The existence of the silos has long been suspected, as the NYT mentions. While the existence of the silos opens the possibility that they may be used to house nuclear-tipped missiles, there is still no further, concrete evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. The silos are an effective defense even if they "only" house "conventional" weapons.
Strategically speaking, even in the unlikely event that Iran announced a nuclear arsenal tomorrow, with the "long-range" delivery implied by the silos, their use of a nuclear device is necessarily, strictly, as they have declared in the silos' announcement, defensive. 'Attribution,' the forensic science of nuclear weapons would conclusively identify the source of the plutonium and/or uranium used to make the weapon. Not to mention the fact that when a missile is launched anywhere in the world, US and EU satellites know about it immediately. And the full trajectory is determined within seconds, from launch point to target. The US (and ROTW*, for that matter) response would be immediate and devastating.
The important question that needs to be asked of the US government is why it continues a policy policy of promoting proliferation. We only need look to N. Korea to see its consequences.
*ROTW=Rest of the World
Thursday, June 9, 2011
[Short entry] Yucca Mountain still has legs
The excellent science policy news service FYI provided by the American Institute of Physics, a bi-weekly (or more) column on science policy developments in Washington, reports on the efforts by various interests to reinstate the nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, near Yucca Flats, Nevada.
It's fact that folks in Nevada generally don't want their ground filled with hot waste. And there's some evidence of this in the candid comments of Rep. Shelley Berkeley (D-NV) who termed the Yucca Mountain Authorization Bill the "1987 screw Nevada bill."
The Big News is the FY 2012 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill prevents funding for any purpose toward the decommissioning of the repository. And Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) is trying to put money into the budget for continuing operations -- in case you didn't have enough to unsettle your stomach with the ongoing and escalating debt-ceiling battle.
A more thorough discussion on Yucca Mountain and the authorization process is forthcoming on this weblog -- with a little luck.
It's fact that folks in Nevada generally don't want their ground filled with hot waste. And there's some evidence of this in the candid comments of Rep. Shelley Berkeley (D-NV) who termed the Yucca Mountain Authorization Bill the "1987 screw Nevada bill."
The Big News is the FY 2012 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill prevents funding for any purpose toward the decommissioning of the repository. And Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) is trying to put money into the budget for continuing operations -- in case you didn't have enough to unsettle your stomach with the ongoing and escalating debt-ceiling battle.
A more thorough discussion on Yucca Mountain and the authorization process is forthcoming on this weblog -- with a little luck.
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